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AJIMJAII LIWIP QUA,4RTERLY
The City contended that A had retained only the naked legal title
and was therefore not entitled to homestead exemption, the other parties
being obviously not qualified, It would appear that the court reasoned
as the City did ; that legal title alone would not suffice.
If the court did so decide, then it would appear that the court over-
looked the obvious fact that even though A had held both the legal and
the equitable title on January 1, on that date A was a mere tenant, if
not in fact, at least as far as his intention was concerned. That inten-
tion was clearly in conflict with the Constitutional provisions.7 Assum-
ing that A held both titles, can it be said that he had the requisite "good
faith" ?
Another question arising from the Simpson case is whether or not the
delivery of a deed to the grantee authorizes the completion of blank
spaces as in the Law Merchant and Negotiable Instrument Law. Ac-
cording to some authorities, when the grantor receives the consideration
and delivers the deed fully executed in other respects, unless a contrary
intention appears, authority to a grantee to fill a blank for his name is
implied.8
NATURE OF RIGHT CONFERRED BY OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSE *
The recent reversal upon rehearing in the Paoli Case demonstrates
confusion as to the nature of licenses, prevalent in Florida as elsewhere.
In this case an administrative board arbitrarily revoked the license of a
horse trainer.' Originally, the court took the position that a mere
7 As will be seen, Note 5, supra, the Constitution declares that the
claimant to exemption must "in good faith" make the premises on
which he resides "his or her permanent home". Would that not exclude
A in the principal case?
8 In Fisher v. Paup, 191 Iowa 296, 180 N. W. 167 (1920), the court
determined that where the seller of property executed a deed with the
grantee's name blank, and the buyer exchanged the property with
another by delivering to him the blank deed, authority in such other
to insert his name as grantee in the blank deed was to be implied, and
when that was done, the conveyance, including covenants, related back
to the date of its execution by the grantor.
Other courts have spoken of this implied authority: Handelman v.
Mandel, 70 Colo. 136, 197 P. 1021 (1921) ; Gilbert v. Plowman, 218 Iowa
1345, 256 N. W. 746 (1934); Holliday v. Clark, Mo., 110 S. W. 2d 1110,
1111 (1937).
*State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin et al. Fla...., 31 So. 2d 627 (1947).
i Paoli, a trainer, had been licensed under rules promulgated by the
State Racing Commission requiring that, "The trainer shall be the
absolute insurer of, and responsible for, the conditions of the horse
entered in the race, regardless of the acts of third parties, . . ." Benze-
drine was found to have been administered to Jane Acker, a horse
trained by Paoli. The substance of the evidence was that at the time
of the race a groomsman. only recently employed, was in charge of
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privilege was conferred by the trainer's license, and there was no interest
sufficient to raise the question of due process. Upon rehearing, the court
changed its position saying, "The possession of the license by relator,
(Paoli) to pursue the profession of a race horse trainer in Florida was a
valuable property right in the relator."
A line of Florida decisions holds that occupational licenses confer
mere privileges. 2 Nevertheless, a licensee who has acted in reliance upon
his license has been protected, 3 and the courts have sometimes recognized
the interest conferred as in the nature of a private or property right.
4
It may be that the origin of this "privilege-property" concept of li-
censes has its roots in the sources of power under which licenses are
issued. The power to require and issue licenses is derived from: (1) the
police power5 and (2) the power to tax.6
Jane Acker, that the horse came in first, and that the groomsman had
placed some bets and went to collect immediately after the race. Paoli
was suspended three days later and the groosman left his employment
immediately thereafter. No participation, negligence, or carelessness
was charged against Paoli but his suspension was based upon the rule
requiring him to be an absolute insurer.
2 In State ex rel Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Stein et al. 130 Fla.
517, 178 So. 133 (1938), the court cites from Corpus Juris, " 'A license
is a mere permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and it is not a contract . . ., neither is it property, or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right', 37CJ 168. 37 CJ 246."
The issuance of an occupational license does not create any contract
right. Bishoff v. State ex rel Tampa Waterworks Co., 43 Fla. 67, 30
So. 808, (1901); Harry E. Prettyman, Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Com-
mission ex rel Branhorn, 92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 442. (1926).
3 In State ex rel Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Stein et .al. 130 Fla.
517, 178 So. 133 (1938), after referring to interests acquired by licensee
as mere privileges the court qualifies this by saying. "However, the
right to profitably enjoy benefits of a license after it is already granted
without undue prejudice to the licensee or undue discrimination in
favor of other licensees similarly situated is implied."
4 In protecting the interest of a licensee against an unreasonable
municipal ordinance the court said that an ordinance interfering with
the personal rights of a citizen to conduct a skating rink as a lawful
means of enjoying his constitutional right to acquire and possess money
and property- by legal means, was void on the grounds of unreasonable-
ness. Inglis v. Ryner, 113 Fla. 732, 152 So. 4 (1934).
5 An act requiring citrus dealers to be licensed was held constitu-
tional as an exercise of the police power. Mayo v. Polk Co., 124 Fla.
534, 169 So. 41 (1936).
6 An ordinance requiring license for wholesale bakery is not an exer-
cise of the police power, but purely a revenue measure. Hamilton v.
Collins, 114 Fla. 276, 154 So. 201, (1934); "an excise tax is a tax laid
upon . . . and upon licenses to pursue certain occupations." City of
Pensacola v. Lawrence, 126 Fla. 830, 171 So. 793, (1937); an act licens-
AJIAIJll LA/i' QUARTERLY
Where a state in the exercise of its police power has granted the per-
mission to some individual or group to do sonic act contrary to a broad
general law or policy-as where gambling is illegal, arid a license to con-
duct a lottery is given-a mere privilege should result. With the in-
creasing demand for revenue, the issuance of licenses may become a
revenue measure under the tax power. Here there is no grant of special
authority to breach general laws, but rather a law making the doing of
an act or acts, heretofore lawful, illegal without a license. The only law
which makes the pursuit of such an occupation illegal is the revenue law
that requires the issuance of a license. Since there is more than a mere
privilege here, the interest of the licensee should be a constitutionally
protected interest: an interest in the nature of a property right. No
distinction as to the power under which a given license was issued is
made in many cases and licenses granted essentially under the tax power
were often cloaked as a police measure. With this intermingling of
licenses as to their source and nature, the courts, sensing the difference
in the nature of the rights conferred, but uncertain as to the reason,
have tended to lump occupations bearing somewhat less social prestige,
such as hawkers, peddlers, pool rooms, race tracks, liquor dealers, etc.,
into one group and say that these licenses confer mere privileges,7
whereas other occupational licenses are often protected as a property
interest.
Under this "privilege-property" concept it results that some licenses
confer a mere privilege revocable at will, while other licenses confer a
protected property interest. The danger in this concept is that the line
between the two is uncertain arid that one acting under a license may be
financially ruined by capricious, arbitrary, morally prudish, or corrupt
administrative agencies.
The Federal Government with respect to its varied administrative
agencies has abandoned the dual 'lprivilegc-property" concept of occupa-
tiotual licellsts anti has guarantevd the licrtlrsee agaillst the danger of arbi-
traln' smspellsion 1' r'vocatirl by the irew Administrative lrocedli1e Act. '
Administrative haw .is iii a period of rapid growth. An iL'reasi_ g
lntullm " h f ol ctipatiolal licenst's art. isstled and srlervisc'l by t i l' variolls
nmntiicipal and adminlistrative hoards of tlorida. Consideratiln shlontdi
he given by the legisltltire to the advisability of state legislation follow-
ing the pattern laid down by the new Administrative Procedure Act,
and guaranteeing to the citizen the following rights:
ing coin operated machines was a revenue measure, Kavanaugh v.
Saxon Amusement Co., 130 Fla. 5, 176 So. 855, (1937).
7 See supra note 2. In the original hearing of the Paoli Case, when
considering Paoli's contention that the regulation was capriciously
arbitrary, the court said: "When the regulation is considered in refer-
ence to the subject matter-horse races and wagering-it is our con-
clusion that the complaint is without merit." See supra note 1; see
State ex rel James v. Gerrell, 137 Fla 321, 188 So. 812 (1938).
s Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946; 60 Stat. 237, 5
S. C, §1001.
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(1) that prompt action will be taken on all applications for occupational
licenses;
(2) that only in cases where there is a real and immediate danger to
public health or welfare, will any administrative agency revoke or
suspend any license except after hearing;
(3) to insure a right of judicial review in proper cases;
(4) to require that a different section of the administrative agency rule
on the evidence, than that section which secures information against
the licensee in any revocation or suspension proceeding;
(5) to provide that no license issued to businesses of a continuing na-
ture shall expire until determination has been made of any timely
application for renewal;
(6) to require the various administrative commissions to establish uli-
forn procedures and make and publish their rules.
WILLS-DIVORCE AS AFFECTING A PREVIOUSLY
EXECUTED WILL
The average person gaining freedom from matrinonial difficulties
gives too little thought to certain lingering effects of the dissolved
marital felationship. Considerable difficulty has arisen in the Courts as
to whether or not divorce revokes the provisions of a pre-existing will as
concerns the ex spouse.
This question to date has not been authoritatively settled in Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court in a recent caset had an opportunity to
pass upon that point but declined affirmatively to do so, ruling instead
upon another ground. However, it is believed that by necessary impli-
cation Florida now holds that divorce standing alone will not revoke
a pre-existing will.
On appeal by the divorced wife for construction of the will, the
Court determined that it Was the intent of the testator, as gleaned from
the four corners of the instrument, that the bequest to the wife was
onditioned upon her surviving him as wife. The portion of the will
which strongly influenced the Court in determining the testator's in1tenl-
tion was; "Unto my beloved wife, Pauline lies, in case she survivs
me, and not otherwise, I give, devise, ;ind bequeath, etc." In addition
the Court enphasized the fact that shotild the first bequest lapse, the
gift would go to his lawful issue, and if this too failed, then to the
testator's brother. From the above the Court concluded it was clearly
the testator's intention to provide for only those. who had a legal or
moral claim to his estate, and since at his death the testator had neither
wife nor bodily issue, the estate therefore passed to the testator's brother.
In this interpretation of the testator's intent, the Court ruled contrary
to the weight of authority.2 The majority rule is that when the words,
I Iles v. Iles ......... Fla .......... 29 So. (2d) 21 (1946).
2 Lavender v. Roseheim, 110 Md. 150, 72 Atl. 669 (1909); In re
Jones, 211 Pa. St. 364, 60 At]. 915 (1905); Bell v. Smelly, 45 N. J.
Eq. 478, 18 At. 70 (1889); 27 Ohio St. 299, 22 Am. Rep. 387 (1875);
Murphy v. Markie, 98 N. J. Eq. 153, 130 Atl. 840 (1920). In re Simp-
son's Will, 280 N. Y. S. 705, 155 Misc. 866 (1935).
